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EXCUSE ME, SIR, BUT YOUR CLIMATE'S ON FIRE:
CALIFORNIA'S S.B. 1368 AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Peter Carl Nordberg*
INTRODUCTION

Just how inventive can a state be in attacking the problem of
global climate change? Climate change is increasingly being recognized as a significant problem. Although national legislation appears
necessary, the federal government has failed to take meaningful
action. As a result, states have begun to act, enacting their own
unique legislation tailored to address the causes of climate change
related to each individual state.
This Note addresses the constitutionality, under the dormant
Commerce Clause, of one of the most innovative pieces of state climate change legislation, California S.B. 1368.1 Part I summarizes the
problem of climate change, particularly emphasizing recent popular
opinion about the issue. Part II discusses political responses to climate change, focusing first on the federal nonresponse and then on
California's novel response. Part III introduces S.B. 1368, discussing
relevant historical events, the legislation itself, and its potential effects
on California as well as neighboring states. Part IV summarizes the
history of the dormant Commerce Clause, focusing on how it applies
to S.B. 1368, and outlining current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Part V discusses in depth different classes of Supreme Court cases that
shed light on S.B. 1368's constitutionality, and then applies those
cases to S.B. 1368, before finally examining an important policy justification for S.B. 1368's constitutional validity-a federalism argument
for allowing states to blaze the trail on environmental issues in the
face of federal inertia.
*

Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008.

1 Act of Sept. 29, 2006, ch. 598, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3792 (West) (codified at
§ 8340 (West Supp. 2007)).
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SERIOUS PROBLEM

The summer of 2006 was the hottest in the United States since
1936.2 The July heat wave set over 2300 daily heat records nationwide. 3 In New York City, the heat led to extensive blackouts. 4 Californians were without power for days at a time; some filed with their
power companies for reimbursement of the costs of food lost from
lack of refrigeration. 5 However, the heat was more than an inconvenience: Approximately 140 people died in California as a result of the
heat wave. 6 That summer was not a one-time spike, either. According
to NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2005 was the hottest
year on record globally, 7 and the ten hottest years on record have
occurred since 1990.8
Climate change is caused by the emission of greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere. 9 Increased levels of greenhouse gases cause the
earth's atmosphere to retain more infrared radiation, leading to
higher temperatures.' 0 Increased global temperatures have led to
shrinking polar ice caps,"1 disappearing glaciers,' 2 and rising sea
levels. 1 3 All of these symptoms have been accompanied by a dramatic,
2
This Summer Was Hottest Since Dust Bowl, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at A20.
3 Id.
4 Alan Feuer, City Dims Lights as Heat Strains the Power Grid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2006, at Al.
5 Gayle Pollard-Terry, If a Blackout Spoils Food, Utility May Eat the Cost: Those Who
Tossed More than Salad in the Recent Outages Can File a Claim, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006,
at K1.

6

Felicity Barringer, California, Taking Big Gamble, Tries to Curb Greenhouse Gases,

N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al.
7 Juliet Eilperin, World Temperatures Keep Rising with a Hot 2005, WASH. POST, Oct.

13, 2005, at Al. 2005 was the fourth year in a row to post record temperatures. See
Now-The Political Climate: Climate Change at the Start of 2006, PBS.oRG, Feb. 10,
2006, http://www.pbs.org/now/science/climatemediaint.html.
8 See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, GLOBAL WARMING SCIENCE (2006), http://
www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fgwscience2005.asp.
9

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE

2001 93,

availableat http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc%5Ftar/wgl/pdf/TAR-Ol.pdf.
10 Id.
11 See Gretchen Cook-Anderson, Arctic Ice Meltdown Continues With Significantly
Reduced Winter Ice Cover, NASA.GOV, Sept. 13, 2006, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2006/seaice-meltdown.html (citing study led by Joey Comiso
finding 6% annual reduction in the polar ice cap over the past two years, compared
with just 1.5% per decade during the period prior to that beginning in 1979).
12 J. Oerlemans, Extracting a Climate Signalfrom 169 Glacier Records, 308 SCIENCE
675, 675-77 (2005).
13

See

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,

CLIMATE

CHANGE

2007

5-7 [hereinafter IPCC 2007 REPORT], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf
(describing sea level rise caused by climate change). The effects of sea level rise
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Scientists have predicted that climate change will increase.
current trends continue unchecked, the amount of annual damage
from climate change could be $300 billion by 2050.16 According to
moderate predictions, global temperatures will rise about four
degrees Fahrenheit during this century. 17 Although the correlation
between these symptoms and increased greenhouse gases is sometimes disputed, 18 the scientific consensus is clear: Climate change is
happening; it is caused, at least in part, by humans; and its consequences could be tragic.1 9
What may be even more important from a political perspective
than the fact of climate change is the perception of climate change.
20
Accounts of the effects of climate change have flooded the media.
In 2004, The Day After Tomorrow, a special-effects-heavy disaster flick

would be especially dire in coastal states like California; a rise of one meter would
cause an estimated encroachment of 200 to 400 meters on California's shoreline.
James G.Titus et al., Greenhouse Effect and Sea Level Rise: The Cost of HoldingBack the Sea,
19 COASTAL MGMT. 171 (1991), at 178, available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/
globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BPPAL/$File/cost of holding.pdf.
14 Andrew C. Revkin, Gases at Level Unmatched in Antiquity, Study Shows, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at A14 ("Shafts of ancient ice pulled from Antarctica's frozen
depths show that for at least 650,000 years three important heat-trapping greenhouse
gases never reached recent atmospheric levels caused by human activities, scientists
are reporting today.").
15 See IPCC 2007 REPORT, supra note 13, at 13 (stating the panel's conclusion that
the effects of climate change would "very likely" be greater in the twenty-first century
than those in the twentieth century, with "very likely" defined as a greater than ninety
percent certainty); see also Barringer, supra note 6 (citing a 2004 National Academy of
Sciences report predicting five times as many heat waves in Los Angeles in a hundred
years, and twice as many deaths resulting from heat).
16 Amy Cortese, As the Earth Warms, Will Companies Pay?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2002, § 3, at 6.
17 Andrew C. Revkin, Budgets Falling in Race to Fight Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2006, at Al.
18 See, e.g.,
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Climate of Opinion,WALL ST. J., April 4, 2007,
at A14 (claiming that the consensus regarding human responsibility for climate
change is "purely a social invention").
19 Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate
Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686, 1686 (2004) (surveying 928 scientific, peer-reviewed journal articles, and finding that none disagreed with the consensus position that human
activities are responsible for dramatic increases in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which in turn have caused "surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean
temperatures to rise.").
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey Kluger, Is Global Warming FuelingKatrina?,TIME.COM, Aug. 29,
2005, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1099102,00.html.
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about the world entering a second ice age caused by climate change,
grossed $186 million at the box office.2 1 An Inconvenient Truth, a documentary about climate change featuring former Vice President Al
Gore, became the third highest grossing documentary ever. 22 The
media attention, combined with the rising temperatures, has led to
significant popular opinion that the federal government needs to do
23
something about the problem of climate change.
II.

POLITICAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE

A.

FederalInertia

In late May of 2002, the Bush administration sent a report on the
potential effects of climate change, drafted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to the United Nations. 24 The report stated that
the United States could experience significant problems as a result of
climate change within a few decades. 25 President Bush distanced himself from the report soon after it was released: His administration
emphasized the "considerable uncertainty" about the science of climate change, and refused to join other developed nations in ratifying
the Kyoto treaty, which placed mandatory greenhouse emissions limits
on most of its members. 26 The Administration instead called for vol21

Barbara Vancheri, "Day After" DirectorStuck with Cold, Hard Reality, PrrT. PosT12, 2004, at B1.
Tina Daunt, Green Is Gold for Gore and His Celeb Pals, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2007,

GAZETTE, Oct.

22
at El.
23
Compare Gary Langer, Poll: Public Concern on Warming Gains Intensity,
ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 26 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/GlobalWarming/
story?id=1750492&page=l (stating that almost seven in ten Americans think the government needs to do something about climate change), with Jon Cohen & Gary
Langer, Poll: Many See No Need to Worry About Warming, ABCNEws.coM, June 15, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/PollVault/story?id=850438
(stating that only
thirty-eight percent of Americans think climate change is a serious problem that the
government needs to do something about). For a description of the heightened public concern for the environment, see Lydia Saad, Americans See Environment as Getting
Worse, GALLUP POLL BRIEFING, Apr. 2006, at 57.
24 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE AcrION REPORT-2002 (2002) [hereinafter CLIMATE AcriON REPORT], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BWHU6/$File/uscar.pdf;
Katherine Q. Seelye,
President Distances Himselffrom Global Warming Report, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A23.
25 CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 24.
26 See Seelye, supra note 24. President Bush has argued that the Kyoto Treaty is
"fatally flawed," notably because it exempts China from its greenhouse gas emission
standards, although he acknowledges rising global temperatures. See Press Release,
Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.
html.
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untary emissions standards.2 7 Because of his administration's slow
response to the threat of climate change, as well as the increasing perception of climate change as a serious danger, President Bush has
come under significant criticism.

28

Accurate or not, this criticism and

the popular opinion on climate change have had two important
effects: First, Congress has begun independent hearings on climate
change, 29 and second, states are taking the initiative in crafting
unique legislation to lower greenhouse emissions. This Note focuses
on one of these acts.
B.

The Political Response of One State: California's Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006 and S.B. 1368

On June 1, 2005, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
signed Executive Order S-3-05. 30 Citing increased temperatures as a
threat to California's coastline, the Sierra snowpack, and the health of
citizens, the Order set aggressive targets for reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions. 3' Schwarzenegger specifically mentioned California's
32
role as a leader on environmental issues.
Fifteen months later, Schwarzenegger got what he wanted: The
California Legislature passed A.B. 32, also known as the Global Warming Solutions Act. 33 On September 27, 2006, Schwarzenegger signed
the Act into law.3 4 The Act gives the California Air Resources Board
27

See Zachary Coile, Global Warming Fear Lights Fire Under Congress, S.F. CHRON.,

Sept. 23, 2006, at Al.
28 See, e.g., Coile, supra note 27 (citing Philip Clapp, president of the National
Environmental Trust, as criticizing Bush's "just-say-no' policy on global warming");
Editorial, Cappingthe Greenhouse, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 2006, at E8 (commenting on

President Bush's hope that climate change "will just go away."). In a Google search
conducted on April 8, 2007 for the phrase "Bush on Global Warming," the top hit was
a Will Ferrell Saturday Night Live sketch parodying Bush's mannerisms and views on
climate change. See Transbuddha.com, Will Ferrell-Bush on Global Warming,
http://www.transbuddha.com/mediaHolder.php?id=1147 (last visited April 8, 2007).
29 See Coile, supra note 27.
30 Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (July 1, 2005), available at http://gov.ca.gov/
index.php?/executive-order/1861/. The order set the goal of reducing state emission levels to 2000 levels by 2010, to 1990 levels by 2020, and to eighty percent of 1990
levels by 2050. Id. The 1990 level was chosen because it was the base level for Kyoto.
See Miguel Bustillo, Gov. Vows Attack on Global Warming, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at
Bi.
31 Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-05.
32 Id.
33 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, 2006 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 2757 (West) (codified in scattered sections of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
(West Supp. 2007)).
34 Id.
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sweeping powers over greenhouse gas emissions, and mandates a
35
reduction to 1990 levels by 2020.

Although some have questioned the achievability of the Act's
goals, 36 the significance of the legislation goes far beyond its effect in
California. First, other states often follow California's lead on environmental issues. For instance, California was the first state to require
catalytic converters.3 7 In 2002, California passed a law regulating carbon dioxide emissions from cars, and now ten states have enacted similar laws.38 Therefore, the Act's greatest impact may be in providing a

model for other states to follow. Second, the Act is an attempt to
rebuke the federal government for its inertia on climate change. In
using the same baseline as the Kyoto Protocol, 39 1990 emission levels,

the Act serves as a statement on the failure of Congress to ratify, and
the Administration to encourage ratification of, Kyoto. Further, just
two months before signing the Act, Schwarzenegger held a meeting
with Tony Blair, one of President Bush's closest allies in international
40
politics, to sign an agreement to collaborate on pollution reduction.
Whether the President got it or not, one commentator succinctly
described the message being conveyed: "On one of the most pressing
scientific issues of our time, the leader of the free world doesn't live in
Washington, D.C. He lives in Sacramento... and his name is Arnold
41
Schwarzenegger."
The Act, in giving the California Air Resources Board control
over in-state entities producing greenhouse gases, provided one half
of California's climate change legislative package. The other half, less
scrutinized but possibly more far-reaching, was S.B. 1368.
III.
A.

S.B. 1368

HistoricalBackground

Other than climate change in general, two historical events are
important to a proper understanding of S.B. 1368 and its potential
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., William Sweet, Clean Air, Murky Precedent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at
Al (arguing that the bill could potentially be undermined by California's prior success regulating emissions, since there are fewer emissions to cut in California).
37 Zachary Coile & Jane Kay, EPA Says It Can't Limit CarEmissions: Agency's Stance
Could Obstruct State Law on Greenhouse Gases, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 2003, at A4.
38 See Barringer, supra note 6 (noting that this law is currently the subject of a
legal challenge); Michael Hawthorne, Blagojevich Aims to Cut Greenhouse-Gas Output,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2007, § 2, at 4.
39 See Bustillo, supra note 30.
40 Editorial, The Hot New Issue, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2006, at B12.
41 Editorial, CaliforniaLeads on Global Warming, OREGONIAN, Sept. 2, 2006, at E04.
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effects: deregulation of the electrical utility industry and the California energy crisis beginning in May 2000.
Prior to deregulation, electrical utility companies were granted
monopolies in a particular geographical area. 42 They were regulated
to prevent abuse of their monopoly. 4 3 These firms were also traditionally "vertically integrated"-that is, they performed all of the services
required for supply of power to the market. 4 4 These services included
generation, transmission, and distribution. 4 5 Now, however, many
states have deregulated their power industries, allowing a competitive
market for electricity. 4 6 As a result, the electric utility infrastructure
has become more decentralized. 47 Instead of the old model, where a
single utility company controlled all aspects of the process, deregulation has resulted in independent generators and marketers buying
and selling bulk power. 48 Now, rather than relying solely on one
entity for power generation, transmission, and distribution, the market for power relies on a multi-faceted chain, which, in theory,
49
enhances pricing and supply.
In 1996, California restructured its electric utility market, specifically creating a new "spot" market for investor-owned utilities to
purchase their power. 50 California also capped the prices utilities
could charge consumers for power. 51 In late May 2000, the plan
backfired, with wholesale prices soaring and utilities getting stuck buying power at the high wholesale prices and selling at the capped
prices. 5 2 The utility companies had to borrow substantial amounts in
order to continue to operate.5 3 Strained capacity led to rolling black42 FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 150
(2000).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 151, 654.
45 Id. at 654.
46 See Steven Ferrey, SustainableEnergy, EnvironmentalPolicy, and States' Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 507, 645 (2004) (stating that twenty-four states and the District of Columbia had deregulated as of 2004).
47 Id. at 515.
48 Nicholas W. Fels & Frank R. Lindh, Lessonsfrom the California "Apocalypse":Jurisdiction Over Electric Utilities, 22 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (2001).
49 Id. at 4-5.
50 Id. at 1.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 11. The prices continued to rise through the summer months as a result
of increased hot weather demand. Id. at 11-12.
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outs. 5 4 On March 9, 2001, one of the largest California electrical util-

55
ity companies, Pacific Gas & Electric, declared bankruptcy.
Aggravated by the famed involvement of Enron and its disgraced
CEO Kenneth Lay,56 the California energy crisis, along with deregulation of the electrical utility market, provide the backdrop for passage
of S.B. 1368.

B.

Description of S.B. 1368

Passed by the California legislature on August 31, 2006 and
signed by Governor Schwarzenegger on September 31, S.B. 1368 is
either an innovative attempt to ensure that California uses only
"clean" power, or it is egregious discrimination against out-of-state
57
electricity generators, depending upon whom you ask.
S.B. 1368 prohibits in-state power distributors from buying power
under a long-term contract (defined as any contract for longer than
five years) with an out-of-state power generator that fails to comply
with emissions standards set up by the California Energy Commission. 58 The standards adopted require that emissions must be "at a
rate of emissions of greenhouse gases that is no higher than the rate
of emissions of greenhouse gases for combined-cycle natural gas
baseload generation. '59 In this way, the legislation is tailored to target
current "dirty" coal production, without banning coal permanently,
60
given the potential for development of cleaner coal technology.
The text of S.B. 1368 contains important legislative findings. The
legislature found that "[g] lobal warming will have serious adverse con61
sequences on the economy, health, and environment of California";
that investor-owned utilities are planning long-term contracts that
would result in greenhouse gas emissions for at least the next thirty
years; 6 2 that forcing utilities to internalize the costs of pollution will
54 Id. at 12.
55 Id.
56 See Peter H. King et al., Paper Trail Points to Roots of Energy Crisis, L.A. TIMES,
June 16, 2002, at Al. Ken Lay was quoted as telling David Freeman, former head of
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, "[i]n the final analysis, it doesn't
matter what you crazy people in California do, because I got smart guys out there who

can always figure out how to make money." Id.
57

Act of Sept. 29, 2006, ch. 598, § 2, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3792, 3795 (West)

(codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340 (West Supp. 2007)); infra Part IV.B.
58 Act of Sept. 29, 2006, ch. 598, § 2, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 3795.
59 Id.
60 See CaliforniaGHG Standard Targeting Coal Power Hits MajorSnags, ENERGYWASHINGTON WEEK, May 17, 2006, at 11 [hereinafter California GHG Standard].
61 Act of Sept. 29, 2006, ch. 598, § 1, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 3794.
62 Id.
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reduce the cost to California of future federal utility regulation; 63 that
regulation of the state's consumption, not just production, of electricity is essential to meaningful climate change; 64 and that California, as
the largest energy market in the West, has a responsibility to act as a
65
leader to other states in issues of regulating emissions.
C. Effects of S.B. 1368
S.B. 1368 places serious restrictions on the market for power. Just
a few years after a devastating energy crisis, California is potentially
risking further shortages and price increases in the name of environmental health. Whether this is a reflection of the gravity of the problem of climate change, the foolhardiness of state legislators bent on
political gain, or a testament to the resilience of the industry and people of California, it certainly adds a sense of the dire consequences
that could occur should S.B. 1368 significantly burden the ability of
66
power companies to contract for power generation.
However, the effect of S.B. 1368 extends beyond the borders of
California. The legislation, targeted especially towards heavily-polluting coal plants, 67 severely limits the power plants that can participate

in the California market. According to the California Energy Commission, approximately forty percent of California's power supply
comes from out of state. 68 Of this amount, about half, or twenty percent of California's power supply, comes from coal; California has no
in-state coal power plants. 69 Further damaging from the perspective
of other states, the power market in California consumes about forty
percent of power produced in the West. 70
63
64

Id.
Id.

65

Id. at 3795.

Because of these facts,

66 See California GHG Standard, supra note 60, at 10 (discussing the possibility that
S.B. 1368 could increase electricity prices).

67

See id. at 11.

68 See CAL. ENERGY COMM'N., CALIFORNIA'S MAJOR SOURCES OF ENERGY, http://
www.energy.ca.gov/html/energysources.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).

69

Id.; see also CONSORTIUM

OF ELEC. RELIABILITY TECH. SOLUTIONS, PLANNING FOR

CALFORNIA'S FUTURE TRANSMISSION GRID 9-11 (2003) (describing how higher natural
gas prices led to increased importation of out-of-state, coal-generated power).
70 See Sweet, supra note 36; see also Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Governor Signs Bill to Limit Dirty Power Generation (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://
www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/060929a.asp (stating that at least thirty-one dirty
coal power plants are being planned or developed in the West, with much of the
power destined for California). S.B. 1368 has already placed one large-scale transmission line, the Frontier Line, in jeopardy. CaliforniaBill Could Stymie Western Generation,
Coal Expansion, 30 PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Sept. 11, 2006, at 9.
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power generators outside of California and states other than California have a great incentive to combat S.B. 1368.

IV.

THE

DORMANT

A.

COMMERCE CLAUSE:

A

FLY IN THE OINTMENT?

Brief History of the Dormant Commerce Clause

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution
provides that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." 7 1 Although it is phrased as a "positive" grant of power to Congress to control interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause "has long
been understood to have a 'negative' aspect that denies the States the
power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate
flow of articles of commerce." 72 The basic principle of the dormant
Commerce Clause is "that our economic unit is the Nation, which
73
alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy."
Two cases stand as the early foundation for dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. First, in Gibbons v. Ogden,7 4 the Court, in overturning a steamboat monopoly given by New York State, considered
briefly the question of whether Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause were exclusive. 75 ChiefJustice John Marshall wrote that
"[lt] here is great force in this argument," but he declined to decide
77
the case on those grounds. 76 Second, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
the Court upheld a Pennsylvania law that required pilots to be
78
employed' on ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia.
The Court held that the jurisdiction to regulate interstate commerce
is concurrent between the federal government and the states. 79 The
Court adopted a national-local distinction to guide in this analysis:
"Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit
only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, mayjustly be said to
be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress." 80
Although the Court has abandoned the national-local distinction,
the basic rule still applies: States cannot discriminate unfairly against
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 209.
Id.
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 319.
Id.
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interstate commerce, but they are not denied entirely the ability to
affect or regulate interstate commerce. 8 I
B.

Relevance of the Dormant Commerce Clause to California'sS.B. 1368

At first glance, S.B. 1368 presents a significant dormant Commerce Clause problem: It appears to discriminate openly against outof-state electricity generators.8 2 After a careful examination, however,
the problem appears more complex. In passing the bill, the legislature made several findings that allege that the bill is indispensable to
the state's environmental regulations, and that relate the bill to California's local interests.8 3 Also, the bill does not really discriminate
outright against importation of power; it just refuses to allow "dirty"
power, in the same way as California might refuse to allow gasoline
below a certain grade to be burned in-state for environmental reasons,
except that the immediate environmental consequences of the "dirty"
power occur out of state. The legislation is even-handed in its treatment of in-state and out-of-state interests: "Dirty" power generation is
as impermissible within California as it is outside the state. Further
complicating the issue, opponents of the bill have brought up the possibility of constitutional infirmity, specifically as to the dormant Commerce Clause, and some have even raised the specter of a court
84
challenge.
81 See infra Part IV.C.
82 As a foundational issue, it is clearly settled law that the dormant Commerce
Clause applies to the importation of power. That is, electricity is an item of interstate
commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. See Fed. Power Comm'n
v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 94 (1965) ("There is no question that the interstate
transmission of electric energy is fully subject to the commerce powers of Congress.").
83 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., CA Lawmaker Proposes Utility GHG Standard Become State Law,
ENERGYWASHINGTON WEEK, March 1, 2006 (stating that Sempra Energy and Southern
California Edison had raised constitutional concerns about the bill); California GI-G
Standard, supra note 60, at 11 (stating that "power generators in California and western states such as Wyoming, Montana and Utah" had complained about the bill, "with
some alleging that ...

[it] .

.

. may violate" the dormant Commerce Clause.); Ame-

thyst Cavallaro, California on the Edge Again, POWER GROUP ONLINE, http://pepei.
pennnet.com/Articles/ArticleDisplay.cfm?ARTICLE-ID-271934
(asking if "one
state [has] the right to regulate how another state does business," and quoting Marcus
Wood, an attorney for Stoen Rives, LLP, as saying that he expects a challenge to the
law); Posting of Carter Wood to ShopFloor.org, http://blog.nam.org/archives/2006/
09/command-andcon.php (Sept. 28, 2006, 06:41) (calling the bill "unconstitutional"). These sources also bring up the possibility of a Supremacy Clause violation;
this possibility is outside the scope of this Note. For relevant discussion of the
Supremacy Clause in similar contexts, see generally David B. Spence & Paula Murray,
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S.B. 1368 presents significant constitutional analytical challenges:
The legislation prohibits contracts with out-of-state entities failing to
comply with environmental regulation, an innovative form of legislation not yet addressed by the Court; similarly, the Court has not dealt
specifically with climate change as a balancing factor for potentially
discriminatory legislation. These points will be discussed in more
detail below.
C.

Basic Outlines of Current Dormant Commerce ClauseJurisprudence

"Whether the issue is state taxation, state environmental regulation, truck safety, or something else, the cases have continually been
decided on an ad hoc basis with the result being that there is no
coherent theory for the Court to follow."

85

Part of the seeming inco-

herence of the Court's current dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is the confusion surrounding the Court's framework for
analysis. The Court sometimes suggests a two-tiered analysis, and
sometimes recognizes a third tier. For instance, in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,86 the Court identified a

two-tiered analysis, stating that when a statute is facially discrimina87
tory, it will be invalidated without analysis of mitigating factors.
However, in Hughes v. Oklahoma,88 the Court cited the Pike test 89 as

the "general rule" of dormant Commerce Clause analysis; although it
found the law facially discriminatory, it used balancing language and
allegedly looked at the purpose of the statute and nondiscriminatory
alternatives. 9 0
The Law, Economics, and Politics of FederalPreemptionJurisprudence:A QuantitativeAnalyREV. 1125, 1146-53 (1999).
85 Brian C. Newberry, Taking the Dormant Commerce Clause Too Far?-West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994), 69 TEMP. L. REV. 547, 556 (1996); see
alsoWinkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Beyond Purpose:Addressing State Discriminationin Interstate
Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REv. 381, 383 (1995) (stating "that there is widespread agreement
that the [dormant Commerce Clause] doctrine is incoherent").
86 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
87 Id. at 578-79.
88 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
89 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (articulating the general rule as follows: "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.").
90 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336-37.

sis, 87 CAL. L.
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Because of this ambiguity, any analysis will be at least partly artificial. 9 1 However, both as an aid in classifying the cases and as an invaluable tool for analysis of S.B. 1368, this Note will use a two-step
classification scheme, as laid out below.
First, if a law overtly discriminates against interstate commerce,
that is, if "simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtual per se rule of invalidity has been erected." 9 2 An obvious
93
example of this is where a state blocks all commerce at its borders.
94
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, a case involving the transfer of
waste, discussed below, the Court suggested that if there was something about the transportation itself that justified discrimination, the
law might be allowable. 95
Second, if the law is facially neutral, but nonetheless has a discriminatory purpose or effect, the Court uses a balancing test, as
found in Pike v. Bruce Church 6 : "[T] he extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.

'97

The Court places the burden on the

state to prove the unavailability of less discriminatory measures and
the importance of the local benefit being served by the challenged
statute. 98 If the Court finds that the law is not discriminatory at all,
either facially, in purpose, or in effect, then the law could be said to
be per se valid. For instance, in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,99 the

Court held that a law imposing a "use" tax equivalent to an in-state
sales tax was valid. 10 0 Justice Cardozo stated that "[e]quality is the
theme that runs through all sections of the statute ....

[T] he stranger

91 For instance, one commentator has observed that the per se rule of invalidity
invites a conclusory analysis: "We are declaring your statute unconstitutional because
it seems to affect insiders and outsiders differently . . . we do not need to explain
further." Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion about the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 167 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
92 City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
93 Id. at 624.
94 437 U.S. 617.
95 Id. at 628-29.
96 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
97 Id. at 142. Ironically, it is generally agreed that the law addressed using the
balancing test in Pike could be found per se invalid today, although this fact does
nothing to diminish the use of the Pike test today. See Cox, supra note 91, at 188.
98 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
99 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
100 Id. at 587-88.
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from afar is subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates." 10 '
V.

SUPREME COURT CASES AND ANALYSIS OF

S.B. 1368

This Part will use the two-part analysis discussed in Part IV.C as an
organizational scheme, along with the result in each case, and will
apply the analysis under each subpart to S.B. 1368. Within each part,
the cases are organized by how the Court characterized the law in
question. Because of the dearth of analytical tools provided by the
Court's jurisprudence, these characterizations are important as a
means of analogy to S.B. 1368.
A.
1.

Facial.Discrimination

Case Law

As explained above, the first step in a dormant Commerce Clause
analysis is to determine if the statute facially discriminates against outof-state economic interests. Discrimination may be defined as "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter." 10 2 As one commentator
has said, "[i]f an ordinance burdens interstate and intrastate commerce equally, it cannot be said to discriminate against interstate commerce. Thus, to test properly for discrimination, a court must draw a
line around a region, enabling it to evaluate whether local businesses
enjoy a competitive advantage ...."103
a.

Laws Prohibiting Export

In dealing with the conservation of natural resources, the Court
has required states to justify discriminatory measures by a showing
that the measure chosen is the least discriminatory of all possible measures. For example, in Hughes, the Court overturned a state statute
prohibiting the export of minnows harvested from state rivers,
streams, or lakes.1 0 4 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held that
this law was facially discriminatory, since it halted export at the state's
borders. 10 5 "At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the
strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the
101 Id. at 583-84.
102 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v.Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
103 Catherine Gage O'Grady, TargetingState ProtectionismInstead of InterstateDiscrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 583 (1997).
104 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323 (1979).
105 Id. at 336.
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absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives."' 0 6 In looking at the
potential "legitimate local purpose," the Court rejected Oklahoma's
claim that the legislation was necessary as a conservation measure, on
the grounds that the state had chosen the most discriminatory of all
10 7
possible measures, that of an outright ban on export.
In New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,'0 8 the Court struck
down a state statute that prohibited the exportation of electricity generated by hydroelectric power plants.10 9 By trying to restrict the transfer of electricity in interstate commerce, New Hampshire had
unconstitutionally protected its citizens at the expense of other
states.' 10 In Wyoming v. Oklahoma,"' the Court struck down an
Oklahoma regulation requiring Oklahoma coal power plants to burn
coal mined in Oklahoma for at least ten percent of their coal
needs." 2 The purpose of the bill, as set out by the Oklahoma legislature, was to keep ratepayer money in Oklahoma and to encourage instate economic development. 113 The Court found that, because of the
patent discrimination against out-of-state interests, the magnitude of
the effect of the discrimination on out-of-state interests was irrelevant." 4 The Court then rejected Oklahoma's attempt to justify the
statute by arguing that it lessened the power industry's reliance on a
single source of coal. 115 Regardless of the legitimacy of the stated
goal, Oklahoma could not reach it by cutting itself off from the
national economy."

b.

6

Laws Prohibiting Import

Cases involving the physical transfer of waste from outside a state
to a landfill inside the state form a large part of the Supreme Court's
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court has consistently held that a statute or regulation that prohibits the importation
of waste is invalid, in spite of cited health and safety concerns.
106 Id. at 337.
107 Id. at 337-38. Less discriminatory alternative means might have included limiting the number of minnows that could be harvested, or limiting the use of minnows
within the state. Id. at 338.
108 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
109 Id. at 344.

110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id.
502 U.S. 437 (1992).
Id. at 440, 461.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 456-57.
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For instance, in City of Philadelphia,'1 7 the Court struck down a
state statute that required approval of the commissioner of the State
Department of Environmental Protection for importation of "any
solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be fed to swine ....

,"l1

The commissioner could approve the transfer of the waste if it did not
endanger "the public health, safety and welfare." 119 Pursuant to the
statute, the commissioner promulgated regulations allowing four
"narrow" categories of waste to enter the state. 120 In adopting the statute, the legislature made specific findings about the effect of out-ofstate waste on NewJersey's environment based on rapidly-diminishing
landfill space. 121

In a majority opinion byJustice Stewart, the Court found that this
statute was protectionist on its face, and therefore subject to the per se
rule of invalidity. 12 2 The Court refused to address the question of legislative intent, although there was disagreement about whether the
statute was specifically intended to protect New Jersey's economy;
instead, the Court said that protectionism can be found in "legislative
means as well as legislative ends."1 2 3 Regardless of the legislative purpose behind the statute, the state could not discriminate "against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some
reason, apartfrom their origin, to treat them differently."' 24 The key question, the Court said, was whether the state was trying to avoid the
effects of "a problem common to many," that is, the problem of waste
disposal, by isolating itself from interstate commerce. 12 5
Where a state uses a fee structure to discourage disposal of waste
in-state, the fee structure must charge an even-handed amount
between waste generated in-state and out-of-state. In Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt

26

the Court struck down a state fee structure

that discriminated against out-of-state waste. 12 7 The Alabama statute
at issue placed a cap on the amount of hazardous waste that could be
disposed of in state, and imposed a fee of $25.60 per ton on all waste
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Id. at 618.
Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 626-27 (emphasis added).
Id. at 628.

126

504 U.S. 334 (1992).

127

Id.

at

334.
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disposed under the cap limits. 12 8 In addition, the statute imposed an
additional fee of $72.00 per ton on out-of-state waste.' 29 The Court,
reiterating the position of City of Philadelphiathat a state cannot isolate
itself from a common problem, held that the discriminatory fee structure was an improper means to a valid goal.' 30 The Court required
the state to show the existence of no other less discriminatory means
and a legitimate local benefit, on the basis that the statute was facially
discriminatory.13 ' Alabama cited a number of important considerations in its use of the discriminatory fee, including environmental conservation, protection of citizens' health, and a revenue raising
consideration; however, the Court rejected these justifications as
insufficiently targeted towards out-of-state waste.' 32 The Court
required that the discrimination itself be justified by some reason
133
other than "'economic protectionism."'
2.

Is S.B. 1368 Facially Discriminatory?

S.B. 1368 initially appears discriminatory; by excluding electricity
generated by noncompliant power plants from being the subject of
long-term in-state contracts, the statute seems to set a barrier at the
state's borders. However, at least facially, S.B. 1368 is not discriminatory. Unlike the law at issue in New England Power, S.B. 1368 does not
give an economic advantage to in-state entities. That is, the law does
not advantage in-state power suppliers or contractors; both are subject
to the same regulation as those outside of California. Notably absent
from the legislative history (or, for that matter, the political rhetoric
surrounding the passage of the act) is discriminatory language or attitudes such as those reflected by former California Governor Davis's
plans to favor "the development of generation capacity for in-state
consumption."

134

Further, unlike the law in City of Philadelphia,or the discriminatory fee structure in Chemical Waste Management, S.B. 1368 does not
128 Id. at 338.
129 Id. at 338-39.
130 Id. at 339-42.
131 Id. at 342-43.
132 Id. at 343-44.
133 Id. at 344 (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992)).
134 See Fels & Lindh, supra note 48, at 28. Governor Davis decried the "10 to 12
percent of the electricity generated in California" that was exported to other states.
Id. (quoting Press Release, Governor Gray Davis, State of State Address (Jan. 8, 2001),
available at http://clinicalfreedom.org/DavisOl.htm). He demanded that the electricity "stay in California to serve the people of this great state." Id. (quoting Governor Gray Davis, Transcript of Press Conference (Feb. 8, 2001)).
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exclude California from a problem common to the nation. In fact,
arguably the constitutional problem with the law is that it is too neutral: rather than regulating within California's sphere, it reaches
through in-state contracts to burden out-of-state interests in the same
way in-state interests are already burdened; the law subjects both to an
equal emissions requiremcnt. Whether this law violates the dormant
Commerce Clause or not, it does not discriminate against interstate
commerce on its face. Therefore, S.B. 1368 is not subject to the per
se rule of invalidity.
B.
1.

The Pike Balancing Test

Case Law
a.

Laws Voiding Other States' Economic Advantages

The Court will strike down statutes having the effect of robbing
other states of their economic advantages, unless the statute is justified under the Pike balancing test. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission,135 the Court struck down a North Carolina statute requiring all closed containers of apples sold in the state to bear
"the applicable U.S. grade or standard," and specifically disallowing
apples bearing only a state grade.1 36 Apple sellers in Washington
State, the nation's largest apple producer, were affected the most by
the statute, with Washington accounting for about half of all apples
shipped in closed containers between states. 13 7 Washington had
adopted a unique, stringent grading system of its own to guarantee
the quality and reputation of Washington apples. 13 8 The grading system required careful state inspection, costing Washington apple growers around one million dollars per year; the Court found that the
grading system was equal or superior to the equivalent federal grading
standards. 139 In order for Washington apple growers to comply with
the new North Carolina statute, they would have to use the federal
grading system, thus foregoing the competitive advantage of the
expensive, strict Washington grading system.1 40 In spite of the legitimate local benefit, the Court found that the statute created too great
135 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
136 Id. at 335.
137 Id. at 336. North Carolina eventually adopted a regulation allowing apples
sold in-state to bear the labels "'Unclassified,' 'Not Graded,' or 'Grade Not Determined,"' but disallowing state grades. Id. at 338 n.2.
138 Id. at 336.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 338.
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a burden on interstate commerce.1 41 Further, the Court found that
this burden constituted "discrimination" for three reasons: the statute
raised the costs of doing business in North Carolina for out-of-state
apple sellers having a separate state grading system, the statute
stripped Washington state of its competitive advantages, and the stat1 42
ute worked to the advantage of in-state apple sellers.
It is important to distinguish this advantage to in-state sellers
from the advantage discussed in the facially discriminatory cases.
Obviously the types of advantage are not identical, or Washington Apple
would have been analyzed as a case involving a facially discriminatory
statute. The distinction considered abstractly is hard to discuss; in the
context of the cases, the line becomes clear. In Oklahoma, the statute
facially advantaged in-state coal producers. In Washington Apple, the
statute facially required the same thing of in-state entities as it did of
out-of-state entities; the effects of the statute, however, when considered in the context of Washington's competitive advantage, achieved
through the expensive inspection system and grading standards,
advantaged in-state apple growers.
Because the effect of the law in Washington Apple was "discrimination"-that is, the law imposed a discriminatory burden-for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the state had the
responsibility to prove that the statute was justified because of the
legitimate local benefits as well as the nonexistence of less discriminatory alternatives. 143 Although North Carolina acknowledged the burden on interstate commerce created by the statute, it claimed that the
statute was justified by its local benefits: Prior to the statute's passage,
thirteen different states shipped apples into North Carolina with state
1 44
grading standards, many having similar confusing names.
Although the Court acknowledged consumer protection as a legitimate local benefit, it held that the statute was not justified on that
basis: The statute did an insufficient job of improving the flow of
information, and discrimination against Washington apples in particular did nothing to help consumers, since Washington apples were
always equal or superior to equivalently graded apples under the fed145
eral standard.

141
142
143
144
145

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

352.
351-53.
353.
349.
353-54.
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Laws "Reaching Into" Other States

In Brown-Forman, the Court held that New York State could not
reach into another state and regulate liquor sales there. 146 In that
case, New York had enacted a statute requiring producers of alcohol
to sell to in-state wholesalers at prices no higher than the lowest price
the producer charged anywhere else in the United States. 14 7 The law
further required that the producer post a schedule with the Liquor
Authority; schedules filed were effective for month-long periods."'4
The appellant paid a promotional allowance to wholesalers throughout the United States; the state Liquor Authority found that this allowance was inconsistent with the schedule filed by appellant, and that,
further, the allowance had the effect of lowering the wholesale cost of
liquor in other states, and so was a violation of the law requiring sales
in New York not to exceed the price offered in any other state. 14 9 The
Liquor Authority tried to revoke appellant's liquor license. 150 The
Court held that the law was unconstitutional: "That the ABC Law is
addressed only to sales of liquor in New York is irrelevant if the 'practical effect' of the law is to control liquor prices in other States." 15 1 The
effect of the law was to require liquor producers, once they had
posted a schedule in New York, to seek approval of the Liquor Commission before lowering prices below the schedule in any other
state. 152 Possibly because the law did not just govern interstate commerce but in effect reached into other states to regulate prices of
goods sold, or possibly because the "stated purpose" of the law was the
economic goal of protecting consumers from price discrimination,
1 53
the Court did not conduct the full Pike balancing test.
c.

Neutral Laws Designed to Protect Consumers

In Exxon Co. v. Governor of Maryland,154 the Court upheld a Mary-

land statute that prohibited petroleum producers and refiners from
146 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 585
(1986).
147 Id. at 575.
148 Id. at 575-76.
149 Id. at 577.
150

Id.

151 Id. at 583 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)).
152 Id. Although cases involving alcohol are complicated by the Twenty-First
Amendment analysis, the Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause was unaffected by the Twenty-First Amendment here. Id. at 584.
153 Id. at 583.
154 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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operating retail service stations within the state.'155 The statute was
enacted following a shortage of petroleum, during which retail service
stations had preferred access to petroleum, making the shortage
worse. 1 56 For at least one of the plaintiffs, Exxon, all of the refined
gasoline sold in the state came from refiners located outside the
state. 157 The Court held that the statute did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause: first, the statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce on its face; second, since there were no in-state refiners of gasoline, the statute was not protectionist in nature; finally, the
statute did not regulate so-called independent dealers who do not
refine or produce petroleum, and so did not treat in-state independent dealers any different from out-of-state independent dealers. 158
As to the last point, the Court noted that the statute would not alter
the proportion in the Maryland gasoline market of goods coming
from out of state and those coming from in state.' 59 The Court held
that this was so even though some of the business might shift to out-ofstate independent dealers from out-of-state producers or refiners:
"[I]nterstate commerce is not subjected to an impermissible burden
simply because an otherwise valid regulation causes some business to
shift from one interstate supplier to another." 160 The dormant Commerce Clause protects the interstate movement of goods from discrimination, not the makeup of a particular market, or particular
interstate suppliers. 161
d.

Neutral Laws Regulating the Environment

In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery,162 a Minnesota dairy challenged a statute prohibiting the sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable
containers.1 63 In enacting the statute, the legislature found that sales
of milk in these containers presented a "solid waste management
problem for the state," encouraged "energy waste," and caused depletion of "natural resources."1 6 4 The Court held, first, that the statute
was not protectionist in purpose or effect, since it regulated evenhandedly between milk containers from outside the state and those
155
156
157
158

Id. at 119.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 125-26.

159

Id. at 126 n.16.

160

Id. at 127.

161

Id. at 127-28.

162

449 U.S. 456 (1981).

163

Id. at 458.

164

Id.

2o88

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

from inside the state, and therefore the statute was not subject to the

virtual per se rule of invalidity. 165 In applying the Pike test, the Court
held that the burden on interstate commerce would be "relatively
minor."'166 Dairies inside and outside the state would have to accommodate their practices around the new regulation, and there was no
evidence that the in-state dairies would somehow be advantaged by
the law. 167 The Court also rejected a claim that in-state pulpwood producers would benefit disproportionately from the regulation;
although pulpwood production was a major Minnesota industry, plastics would still be used in some milk containers, and the burden on
the out-of-state interests was not clearly excessive compared to the instate environmental benefits. 168 Alternative suggestions for alleviating
the problem either created a greater burden on interstate commerce
or were not as effective.
2.

169

Is S.B. 1368 Valid Under the Pike Balancing Test?
a.

Does S.B. 1368 Burden Interstate Commerce, and Is It
Therefore Subject to the Balancing Test?

If a law is found not to be facially discriminatory, the analysis
turns to whether the law has a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce, and therefore whether the balancing test applies. The question here, as outlined in Washington Apple, is whether the statute
imposes some additional burden on other states or entities in other
states. Specifically, Washington Apple identified three types of discrimination applying in the context of out-of-state sellers: raising the cost of
doing business for out-of-state sellers, stripping other states of their
competitive advantages, and advantaging in-state sellers. All three of
these apply to S.B. 1368: the statute requires out-of-state power suppliers having noncompliant power plants to either upgrade their facilities or to stop doing business in California; other states arguably have
the competitive advantage of a lower regulatory standard, and this
statute strips them of that advantage as to sales to California power
suppliers; finally, in the Washington Apple sense, the statute advantages
in-state sellers. That is, like the statute in Washington Apple, S.B. 1368
does not advantage in-state sellers on its face, but when considered in
light of the fact that other states may (and do) have more permissive
165
166
167
168
169

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

471-72.
472.
472-73.
473.
473-74.

200 7 ]

EXCUSE

ME

SIR,

BUT

YOUR

CLIMATE'S ON FIRE

2089

environmental regulations relating to power plants, the statute advantages in-state power providers.
However, S.B. 1368's discrimination is not the same as the discrimination at issue in Brown-Forman. S.B. 1368 does not force sellers
in other states to comply with its regulation separately from their dealings with California. In Brown-Forman, the law, in effect, regulated
sales apart from those made in-state: Sales to consumers in other
states were effected as well. S.B. 1368 certainly affects interstate commerce, but it does not prohibit "dirty" power plants from dealing with
distributors in states other than California. Therefore, Brown-Forman's
refusal to use the Pike balancing test analysis is irrelevant to S.B. 1368.
b.

Is S.B. 1368 Invalid Under the Pike Balancing Test?

Because S.B. 1368 is not facially discriminatory but is discriminatory in effect, the law is subject to the Pike balancing test. To be constitutional, a law's discriminatory effects cannot outweigh its local
benefits; because of the ad hoc and subjective nature of this analysis,
the most effective predictions must be made through careful examination of the Court's prior jurisprudence.
The invalid law closest to S.B. 1368 is the law in Washington Apple.
Both laws appear to govern neutrally but are actually discriminatory in
effect. In each instance, the law increases the burden on out-of-state
entities trying to do business with in-state entities, while couching that
burden in neutral language. However, a careful reading of the balancing analysis in Washington Apple reveals an important difference
between the apple grading standard law in Washington Apple and S.B.
1368: S.B. 1368 actually will further its purpose of lowering carbon
emissions, while the law in Washington Apple did not further its purpose of protecting consumers 170 because the Washington apple standards discriminated against were actually more rigorous than the
applicable federal standards, while the out-of-state emissions standards at odds with S.B. 1368 are clearly lower than the new California
standards.
Compared to the law in Exxon, S.B. 1368 regulates an industry
that has both in-state and out-of-state providers; therefore, it is possible that the law could protect the in-state providers from competitors
outside the state. The Court in Exxon did note that the dormant Commerce Clause does not protect the particular makeup of an interstate
market, 171 but S.B. 1368 threatens to move business from out-of-state
interests to in-state interests, something the law in Exxon did not do.
170 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comn'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977).
171 Exxon Co. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978).

2090

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

82"5

For this reason, the burden on interstate commerce imposed by S.B.
1368 is greater than that imposed in Exxon.
The closest valid law to S.B. 1368 from a dormant Commerce
Clause perspective is the law at issue in Clover Leaf In both cases, the
law was enacted for a legitimate, environmental purpose. In both
cases, the law is facially neutral. Further, the burden on interstate
commerce is similar: Both in-state and out-of-state sellers have to
adapt to the law, but only as far as products shipped into the state, and
the regulations are specifically tailored to prohibit only the portions
of the products (either the environmentally damaging milk containers
or the production of power by environmentally "dirty" means) that
are related to the state purpose.
However, there is one significant difference between S.B. 1368
and the law at issue in Clover Leaf The law in Clover Leaf specifically
targeted a "local" problem: That is, the environmental damage at issue
was a burden borne by the state and the state's residents. The waste
management problems created by plastic milk containers had to be
dealt with inside Minnesota. S.B. 1368 is specifically targeted to a
problem that is clearly not "local," and, in fact, the problem the law is
designed to fix is created outside California's borders.
In spite of this difference, there are several reasons to believe that
the local benefit created by the law is sufficient to prevent it from
being found unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.
First, the California legislature, likely aware of the dormant Commerce Clause questions presented by the law, made a number of legislative findings related to the in-state effects of climate change. 172 The
findings section referred to Governor Schwarzenegger's executive
order, which discussed the threat to California's oceanfront, the
Sierra snowpack, and the health of California citizens. 17 3 Second,
because of the near-universal scientific acceptance of the connection
between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, California can
only control the problems of climate change within its state if it can
control the environmental quality of the products, including electricity, that its citizens are consuming, at least in the absence of federal
legislation. Third, forcing California power plants to comply with California's stricter emissions requirements, effectively internalizing environmental costs, but allowing other power plants in the west to
produce "dirty," cheap power and export it to California, would
unduly disadvantage California's power industry-S.B. 1368, in effect,
requires that out-of-state industries internalize their environmental
172 Act of Sept. 29, 2006, ch. 598, § 1, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 3794.
173 Id.
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Finally, because of a federalism-related argument that will be

discussed below, states should be given the benefit of the doubt when
attempting to use effective means to regulate the environment.
E.

One Significant Policy Consideration: The Role of States in
Environmental Regulation

The Court has held that federal regulation of the environment is
constitutionally valid under the Commerce Clause, although this
power is slowly being eroded. 175 Also, federal regulation of the environment is desirable for a number of reasons. First, federal regulation preempts potential interstate conflicts. Second, federal
regulation is vitally important when an international environmental
problem is at issue. Finally, federal regulation, because of its uniformity, is more likely to effectively deal with a national environmental
concern. 176
Also, it is important to note that the strongest arguments in favor
of state regulation of the environment may be inapplicable to the
problem of climate change. The greatest benefits of state regulation,
as Professor Jonathan Adler points out, stem from the local nature of
the problem being remedied. 17 7 A localized regulation can be tailored closely to match a localized problem; similarly, local knowledge
174 See Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 250-51
(1999) (arguing that, in some environmental circumstances, applying the dormant
Commerce Clause strictly may actually discourage economic efficiency, since some
state statutes force industries to internalize their environmental costs).
175 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277
(1981). The Court has significantly constricted the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause since it decided Hode4 although it has not explicitly overruled its
holding there. SeeJonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 389 (2006). Professor Klein has argued that the
Court has steadily diminished the ability of both the federal government and state
governments to regulate the environment by shrinking the federal government's
power under the "positive" Commerce Clause and by expanding the dormant Commerce Clause, respectively. See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause,
27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2003).
176 Jonathan H. Adler, JurisdictionalMismatch in EnvironmentalFederalism, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 130, 140-42 (2005); see also Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in MandatingState Implementation of National EnvironmentalPolicy,
86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-15 (1977) (arguing that federal action can more appropriately address environmental problems). But see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2374-76 (1996) (criticizing
federal environmental legislation on the grounds that it has been ineffective at forcing internalization of environmental costs).
177 Adler, supra note 176, at 137-38.
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and expertise can be brought to bear in crafting legislation aimed at a
uniquely local problem. 178 This justification is inapplicable in the
context of climate change, since the problem is hardly unique to any
single locality.
What, however, is the role of states in environmental regulation
when the federal government refuses to act? Should states be given a
little more constitutional leeway to enact environmental regulations
that arguably burden interstate commerce impermissibly? Justice
Brandeis, in his dissent in the 1932 case New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,179 famously described states as laboratories of democracy:
"Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory."' 180 Professor Adler has argued that, in the context of
at least some environmental problems, state regulation has some significant advantages over federal regulation.' 8 ' One of these advantages is the flexibility that a state, acting on its own to combat an
environmental problem, can have to create innovative legislative solutions. 18 2 Because of these "new and improved" legislative techniques,
states have the benefit of learning "from each others' successes and
failures." 18 3 These justifications are particularly relevant as applied to
S.B. 1368.184 Because its risks-a potentially reduced electricity supply with corresponding higher prices-are limited to California, other
states will have an opportunity to gauge the effectiveness and practicality of S.B. 1368 without endangering their own electricity supply.
Further, should S.B. 1368 prove to be as effective as the California
legislature expected it to be, it could be a powerful political tool for
congressmen (or a future president) trying to push through similar
legislation on a national level.
178 Id. If it is, in fact, "more efficient and effective to address environmental
problems through institutions of equivalent scope as the problem in question," then

only action on the national or international level, possibly through an international
treaty, can adequately address the problem of climate change. Id. at 133.
179

285 U.S. 262 (1932).

180 Id. at 311.
181 Adler, supra note 176, at 134-39.
182 Id. at 137.
183 Id.
184 Federalist arguments in dormant Commerce Clause contexts frequently come
from strange places. As Professors Spence and Murray have pointed out, this context
puts particular judges in a conflicted position: Often, their federalist tendencies conflict with their political feelings regarding the regulation at issue. See Spence & Murray, supra note 84, at 1128-29.
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CONCLUSION

Scientists, government reports, the media, and common sense all
tell us that our climate is changing. And if high summer temperatures, their accompanying blackouts, and heat-related deaths are not
enough to motivate us try to fix the problem, climate change threatens to cause a litany of climate-related terrors worthy of a Hollywood
disaster flick: rising sea levels, melting glaciers, reduced water supply,
and increased hurricanes.
Whether the most extreme of these potential consequences are
realistic, they are part of the public perception of climate change. In
response to these threats to the planet, to public concern, and to the
federal government's perceived failure to act, can a single state adopt
an innovative measure tailored to reduce that state's impact on the
environment? California's S.B. 1368 is a potentially effective measure,
targeted at reducing California's "environmental footprint," even
outside of the state. The statute requires utility companies desiring to
supply California with electricity to internalize their environmental
costs. A court considering the constitutionality of the measure should
defer to the California legislature in its judgment; in so doing, a court
would be striking a blow for the environment. More importantly, the
measure should be considered constitutional because, under the analysis laid out above, it is consistent with the Supreme Court's dormant
Commerce Clause precedent. California should be afforded the right
to respond to this threat, to be "the leader in the fight against climate
185
change."

185

Bustillo, supra note 30 (quoting Governor Schwarzenegger).
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